Abstract Distributed Online Social Networks (DOSN) are a valid alternative to OSN based on peer-to-peer communications. Without centralised data management, DOSN must provide the users with higher level of control over their personal information and privacy. Thus, users may wish to restrict their personal network to a limited set of peers, depending on the level of trust with them. This means that the effective social network (used for information exchange) may be a subset of the complete social network, and may present different structural patterns, which could limit information diffusion. In this paper, we estimate the capability of DOSN to diffuse content based on trust between social peers. To have a realistic representation of a OSN friendship graph, we consider a large-scale Facebook network, from which we estimate the trust level between friends. Then, we consider only social links above a certain threshold of trust, and we analyse the potential capability of the resulting graph to spread information through several structural indices. We test four possible thresholds, coinciding with the definition of personal social circles derived from sociology and anthropology. IIT-CNR, Via G. Moruzzi 1, 56017, Pisa, Italy network to "active social contacts" leads to a graph with high network connectivity, where the nodes are still wellconnected to each other, thus information can potentially cover a large number of nodes with respect to the original graph. On the other hand, the coverage drops for more restrictive assumptions. Nevertheless the re-insertion of a single excluded friend for each user is sufficient to obtain good coverage (i.e., always higher than 40 %) even in the most restricted graphs. We also analyse the potential capability of the network to spread information (i.e., network spreadability), studying the properties of the social paths between any pairs of users in the graph, which represent the effective channels traversed by information. The value of contact frequency between pairs of users determines a decay of trust along the path (the higher the contact frequency the lower the decay), and a consequent decay in the level of trustworthiness of information traversing the path. We show that selecting the link to re-insert in the network with probability proportional to its level of trust is the best re-insertion strategy, as it leads to the best connectivity/spreadability combination.
Introduction
Online Social Networks (hereinafter OSN), like Facebook and Twitter, are undoubtedly modifying our lives. Thanks to OSN we are witnessing a rapid shift from the physical world of face-to-face communications to the world of virtual contacts and ubiquitous services. This, and the presence of increasingly smart devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets, and smart objects) are significantly contributing to the so called Cyber-Physical World (CPW) convergence [15] , for which actions in the physical world modify the state of entities in the virtual world and vice-versa. This is particularly evident in the Internet of Things scenario, where the number of devices per user will be stuggering, providing a deep intersection between physical, virtual, and social spheres of individuals [9] . The paradigm on which OSN are built allows people to create and share content amongst themselves in the virtual world, empowering individuals and allowing them to create communities and services, which are more and more impacting on the life in our physical world. In this new scenario, the data users generate, which, for their complexity, heterogeneity and quantity, are called "big data", represent a treasure of inestimable value for service providers and final users. Big data are indeed aggregated and analysed to create novel services, such as predictions of events happening in the physical world through the analysis of communication data in OSN (e.g., car crashes detection [29] , prediction of disease spread [31] ). Although these services are important to the people, OSN service provider often centralise and limit the access to the big data their users generate. Consequently, and due to the high intrinsic value of the data, wealth is centralised as well, possibly leading to power law economies [25] .
Recently, new decentralised solutions based on the paradigm of OSN, known as Distributed Online Social Networks [27] (hereinafter DOSN), have appeared on the market (like diaspora* [1] and PeerSon [11] ), accompanied by a growing research interest in the field. DOSN replicate OSN features in a decentralised way, avoiding data centralisation. Each user maintains her personal data locally or on intermediate servers, and interactions between users occur through peer-to-peer (P2P) communications. Compared to OSN, DOSN may guarantee more transparency in data management.
As in more traditional OSN, DOSN allow users to create and manage their digital personal space, where they can post and receive asynchronous messages, and insert their personal information. Moreover, DOSN support the creation of social links between users, giving different access policies to digital personal spaces for friends compared to strangers. DOSN also provide instant messaging functionality in the form of private communications.
Research in the field of DOSN is mainly focussed on providing networking functionality even in highly dynamic scenarios with mobility of nodes and possible absence of access to network infrastructure [10] . From a technological perspective, DOSN are already based on rather solid solutions. Yet, from a higher level perspective, little is known about the capacity of DOSN to diffuse information. The ability to quickly spread information amongst people is one of the key properties of OSN, and assessing this capacity in DOSN is fundamental to understand possible limitations of the system and to design new services for distributed environments. In DOSN, the main limitation for the analysis of information diffusion is the lack of large-scale communication data sets. This is because data in DOSN are completely decentralised and content is exchanged directly between the personal devices of users. For this reason, the circulation of information cannot be easily traced. Nevertheless, DOSN clearly share similarities with OSN, for which data sets of communication data are easier to be obtained and analysed. The main difference between OSN and DOSN is that in the latter content is disseminated within the network only through chains of direct communications between users. This encourages users to have a more strict control over the data passing through their social links. In fact, too many accesses to the web page of a profile could represent a bandwidth wastage for the related user. In addition, since no central control exists over the exchanged content, accounts generating spam and other kinds of undesired content must be detected and blocked directly by the users. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that DOSN users will be willing to help replicating and disseminating content coming primarily from a set of users they trust most [30] . This has been also noted in mobile networks, where social relationships have been found to influence routing, and the quantity of information circulating between users [39] . This means that, for certain applications, the effective social graph in DOSN may be limited to the links between users with a strong enough social relationship. Starting from this assumption, we can estimate structural properties of the social graph in DOSN by analysing OSN data, after eliminating links under a certain level of trust.
Based on these general remarks, in this paper we analyse information diffusion capacity in DOSN. To do this, we study various properties of a network graph representing a large portion of Facebook, restricting social links to trusted relationships only (we discuss how we estimate trust later on). In particular, we look at the connectivity and the spreadability properties of large components containing connected nodes in the graph after the deletion of untrusted links. The former property represents the degree to which nodes in the resulting graph are connected to each other in a unique component, whereas the latter represents the intrinsic capacity of the graph to spread information. The graph could contain more than one component, each of which represents an isolated portion of the original network through which information can potentially reach all the nodes inside it. Clearly, different network components (and thus different information dissemination patterns) emerge depending on whether more or less strict trust restrictions are considered. Our analysis is aimed at discovering if these components are large enough to cover a significant portion of the users and if their structure is suitable for diffusing information. This could help to identify the impact of DOSN on the market and whether they could be considered a valid alternative to OSN or not in terms of their capacity to spread information, and, for example, for advertisement.
To perform the analysis, we firstly estimate the trust level between users in Facebook through the frequency of interactions between them. In particular, even though estimating trust is a complex task it is known from the sociology literature that trust is proportional to emotional closeness [22] . As emotional closeness can be reliably estimated by contact frequency using linear models [4] , we assume that frequency of contact over a link and trust between the endpoints of that link are proportional. Hence, we simulate content diffusion in the Facebook network graph considering different thresholds for selecting trusted links. We assume that no central control exists on this network and we select the set of trusted contacts for its users according to their contact frequency, then studying the properties of the resulting graph. Specifically, if a social relationship is not trusted (i.e., it does not have a sufficiently high contact frequency), the respective social link is not included in the graph which we use in the analysis. To assess the impact of the selection of trusted links, we define the minimum level of trust by setting a threshold on the contact frequency of the links to be included in the graph. We take values of this threshold equal to the frequencies of contact that have been used in the literature for defining different levels of social relationships [22] . In particular, we consider the well known ego network model [34] , whereby social relationships of a user (ego) can be divided in concentric layers of increasing size and decreasing social intimacy (i.e., corresponding to decreasing tie strength and fewer interactions). In this way we obtain different social graphs with different minimum levels of trust, that coincide with a natural categorisation of social relationships in humans. Note that this way of estimating trust lends itself to automatic systems to decide on which social links to accept content, just by monitoring the frequency of interactions on them.
We compare the results obtained for the different thresholds to identify the values that lead to a large enough connected component, with a sufficient ability to spread information. The results of the analysis indicate that limiting content spread to social contacts which coincide with the definition of "active social contacts" of the users, corresponding to the most external layer in the ego network model, leads to a network graph with a sufficiently large component of connected nodes, that covers more than 96 % of the original Facebook network. Restricting content spread to the next layer of the ego networks, or further, makes the relative size of the biggest connected component (and therefore coverage) drop below 30 %. Since the remaining components are very small compared to the largest one for all the used thresholds, diffusing information in the network could be problematic when the largest component does not cover a sufficiently high number of nodes. As a possible solution to increase node coverage in case of very restrictive thresholds we investigate the effect of re-inserting in the graph only one social contact for each user, selected with different possible strategies (e.g., select the link with highest/lowest contact frequency with the user, random selection, etc.). The results indicate that this solution considerably increases the number of covered nodes, even in case of very strong trust. Notably, all the strategies, included the selection of the contact with highest contact frequency (below the minimum contact frequency imposed by the restriction), leads to very high improvement in terms of node coverage. Clearly, adding a contact to the list of trusted nodes represents a cost for the users in terms of additional unwanted content, but limiting the choice to a single node should be a reasonable solution for them since they would receive a global return in terms of quality and quantity of information circulating in the network. The best strategy to adopt, as far as network connectivity is concerned, is the selection of the peer to re-insert in the list of trusted peers of each user with a probability proportional to the contact frequency of the related link.
This paper extends our previous work in the field [5] . Specifically, in the previous work we studied only the connectivity measure of the obtained components. Here we introduce an additional and more detailed analysis on the ability of the largest connected components found at each level of threshold to effectively spread information, depending on the trust on the diffusion path. In particular, we assume that each link information traverses has a cost which is inversely proportional to the contact frequency (that we use to estimate trust) of the relationship between the involved users. To measure the capacity of the components to spread information, we measure a series of properties of the path between any two nodes in the graphs, considering the cost of traversing links to discriminate between possible multiple paths. We also assume that the trustworthiness of information traversing a link is proportional to the trust level on the link. Hence, we quantify the trustworthiness of information traversing a complete path as the product of trust level (estimated by contact frequency, between 0 and 1) on the single links composing the path. We identify the best path between pairs of nodes as the weighted shortest path calculated through Dijkstra's algorithm, where the weights of the links are calculated as the inverse of their contact frequency. Then, we calculate the average properties of the paths for the different components (at different thresholds), and for the different re-insertion policies. The results indicate that the probabilistic re-insertion strategy is not only the best one in terms of node coverage, but also shows better performances in terms of information diffusion than other strategies with comparable node coverage.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we describe the Facebook data set we have used for the analysis. Hence, in Section 3 we introduce the methodology we use, and we define the values of the threshold we use in the analysis. Then, in Section 4 we report the results of the analysis. In Section 5 we discuss the main findings of our work. In Section 6 we describe the related work in the literature, especially the most relevant DOSN solutions already existing. Last, in Section 7 we draw the conclusions of our work.
Data set description
To perform our analysis, we use a large-scale Facebook data set containing information about social interactions between users. The data set represents a large Facebook regional network, with more than 3 million users and more than 23 million social links between them, which has been downloaded in 2008, when the default privacy policy allowed users within a regional network (a feature removed by Facebook in 2009) to see all the personal data of other users in the same network. The data set is publicly available for research 1 and it has been largely used for other analyses since it shows typical social network characteristics [3, 38] .
The data set contains information about the existence of social links between users, that are represented by a social graph, where nodes represent Facebook users and links Facebook friendships between them. On the other hand, social interactions recorded in the data set are represented by a series of interaction graphs, each of which contains the number of interactions occurred on the social links within temporal windows of increasing duration. The interaction graphs identify communications occurred respectively one month, six months, one year before the download, and for the all the duration of the relationships. By combining these graphs, we have been able to estimate the contact frequency between users [3] , obtaining a unique graph where the links are weighted by the contact frequency between the involved users.
More formally, we obtain a graph G = (V , E) formed of a set of vertices (or nodes) V , and a set of edges (or links) E connecting pairs of nodes, each of which represents a 2-element subset of V. For convenience, we identify an edge by the nodes it connects. For example, {i, j } represents the link between node i and j . The contact frequency of the link 1 http://current.cs.ucsb.edu/socialnets/ is defined as f i,j . The graph in our data set is undirected. This means that {i, j } is equal to {j, i} and their contact frequency is also the same.
The complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the contact frequency for the links in the graph obtained from the data set is depicted in Fig. 1 . The figure indicates that the distribution has a power law trend, thus implying that most of the links in the network have a very low level of trust, whereas only few links have very high trust. For this reason, we expect that restricting the network to trusted links only could have a strong impact upon the structural properties of the resulting graph.
Social networks for content diffusion
Since in our analysis we are interested in users who actively communicate with others, we select from the Facebook graph only the users with at least one active link (i.e., with contact frequency > 0) and we discard all the other users, that indeed are inactive. Moreover, we further restrict the analysis to the set of users that have communicated with other users at least 6 months before the time the data set was downloaded. This ensures that our analysis is restricted to sufficiently stable users. In fact, the contact frequency of new users in OSN is generally higher than that of older (and more stable) users [38] and could bias the analysis. The resulting graph, after this pre-process, consists of 1,083,209 nodes and 7,709,309 links.
Trusted contact list based on the ego network model
The ensemble of social relationships of a person can be modelled as an ego network, that is a simple social network model which considers only an individual (called "ego") and the set of people with whom she has a social relationship (called "alters"). The main property of human ego networks is the presence of a hierarchical structure formed of layers of alters around the ego [34] . The typical structure of ego networks in human social environments shows four concentric layers containing alters at different levels of emotional closeness and with different size. Since the emotional closeness depends upon several psychological aspects of the relationship it is generally difficult to be directly measured. Nevertheless, it is strongly correlated with the contact frequency [22] , and thus it is generally estimated using the latter.
In the ego network hierarchical structure, depicted in Fig. 2 , the first and innermost layer is the support clique, containing on average five people very close to the ego and contacted by her at least once a week. The sympathy group (that includes the support clique) contains fifteen members contacted at least once a month. The affinity group contains fifty members contacted at least ∼ eight times a year [3] . Lastly, the active network contains 150 people contacted at least once a year. The members of this last layer are people for whom the ego invests a non negligible amount of cognitive resources for the maintenance of their social relationships. Beyond the active network, alters are mere acquaintances or friends no longer contacted, and their social relationships are not actively maintained by the ego.
Alters in the same layer share similar properties in their relationships with the ego. Specifically, people in the support clique, broadly identified as "very intimate friends", are those contacted by the ego also in case of need of financial or emotional support, and thus are typically the ones the ego trusts the most. The sympathy group is composed of "close friends" to the ego, contacted less frequently than alters in the previous layer, and generally representing the group of reliable friends on whom one can depend for a variety of exchange relationships (e.g., friendships in the social sense, protection against harassment, minimising social stress, distributed childcare) [34] . The affinity group is formed of "friends", contacted by the ego when she cannot find enough available friends in the affinity group with specific skills she needs to solve a task or in situations requiring a group of several people. Lastly, The active network contains "casual friends", usually contacted by the ego for a particular event or in case of need to access resources outside her social network. In fact, members of this layer are usually loosely connected with the ego and share a small number of mutual relationships, and represent bridges to reach other social groups. From this characterisation, it is clear that the trust level between the ego and her alters decays from the inner to the outer layers of the ego network. In support of this, the contact frequency between people has been found to be correlated with trust, both in anthropology [33] and social network analysis [2] .
Based on the definition of the ego network layers, we can identify possible trusted contacts lists definitions that could be adopted in DOSN. This can be done by selecting social relationships belonging to a specific ego network layer, which can be identified by using the typical threshold of contact frequency of the layer. Note that the values of these thresholds have been found in several studies in offline and online social networks, indicating that they are invariant to the use of specific communication means, and they are instead determined by human cognitive and social processes [34] . Of course, contact frequency could slightly differ from the typical values we presented before since different social platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Google+) could have differences in their social interaction mechanisms, but the order of magnitude of the contact frequency for the different layers remains consistent amongst different communication media. In the case of the dataset we analysed, the thresholds which characterise the layers are very close to the typical values found in the literature [3] . Thus, we use these values to create four possible trusted contact lists for each user, and thus four different network graphs. For example, to simulate the presence of lists containing "friends" we can fix the minimum contact frequency to be considered in the analysis to eight messages a year (the affinity group). In the rest of the paper we indicate the values of the thresholds in number of messages per month, so "1/12" represents one message a year, "8/12" eight messages a year, "1" one message per month, and "4" four messages per month.
Network connectivity
The network connectivity is the property of a social network indicating the extent to which its nodes are interconnected to each other. Usually, social networks are formed of a giant component of connected nodes covering the vast majority of the nodes, and the remaining nodes divided into a large number of small and isolated components [8] . Clearly, disconnected components do not contribute to the diffusion of information since they are not reachable from the largest part of the network, and information generated by them remains isolated. Thus, the largest the giant component the higher the potential capacity of the network to diffuse information to a large number of nodes. To quantify network connectivity, we measure the fraction of nodes in the largest component of connected nodes with respect to the total number of nodes in the network.
To further characterise the structure of the network, we define the percentage of nodes in the largest connected component of the network graph with respect to the total number of nodes in the network as "node coverage". The higher this percentage, the higher the potential of the network to make information circulating among all the nodes. Moreover, we consider the minimum number of components needed to cover a certain percentage of nodes of the network. Regarding information diffusion, the number of components needed to reach a certain node coverage represents the minimum number of message replicas to be generated. In fact, since the involved components are disconnected from each other, information cannot spread amongst them, and a replica of the message to be spread must be created and injected in each component.
Having defined the network graphs at different levels of trust using the identified thresholds on the contact frequency, we assess their potential capacity to diffuse information. Specifically, for each graph we studied its network connectivity, and the impact of the number and the size of their components considering several levels of node coverage.
Network spreadability
We informally define network spreadability as the property of a network graph indicating its capability to diffuse information. This depends on two main factors: (i) the structure of the network, and in particular the distance in number of edges between nodes, and (ii) the contact frequency between pairs of nodes. In fact, the smaller the average number of links between nodes to be traversed by information to reach the other nodes, the higher the probability of obtaining large infections, as the propagation through each link is not guaranteed. Specifically, information diffusion on a link depends upon the importance and the trust level of the underlying social relationship [2, 33] , and, in particular, upon the contact frequency between the users [7] . For these reasons, network spreadability can be quantified by analysing the properties of the weighted shortest paths between nodes in the network graph. The shortest paths between random pairs of nodes in the graphs represent the shortest way for information to reach a destination from a random source. The analysis of the properties of these shortest paths, calculated considering the weight on each link, permits to better characterise the intrinsic ability of the graph to diffuse information. In addition, we assume that any piece of information that is exchanged over a link undergoes a loss of associated trustworthiness which is proportional to the trust between the two users. Quantitatvely, we estimate the decay of trustworthiness over a link with a number between 0 and 1 (where 0 means total distrust, and 1 complete trust), and estimate the total loss of trustworthiness over a path as the product of trust decays over path links. The analysis of trustworthiness decay over shortest paths allows us to quantify the level of trustworthiness of information circulating in the graph.
Note that, whilst network connectivity indicates the maximum number of nodes which could be potentially infected by information with a certain number of message replicas, network spreadability indicates the capability of the nodes in a single component to spread information to each other. These properties describe different aspects of the network, and allow us to analyse the relation between the structure of the network weighted by the importance of the relationships between users (thus including their trust) and information diffusion.
A weighted shortest path is the sequence of links connecting a pair of nodes in a network with the lowest sum of link weights. The weight represents the cost to travel to a certain link (e.g., the distance or the cost of sending a message through the link). In our case we use the inverse of the contact frequency of the links as weight. For convenience, we also normalise the weights to be in [0,1]. The weight of social links between any pair of vertices {i, j } in the set of vertices V (g) of the network graph g is calculated as follows:
where f i,j is the contact frequency between i and j , and thus 1/f i,j is the weight before normalisation, while min
f i,j is the normalisation factor.
To calculate the weighted shortest paths in the four graphs obtained by applying the thresholds, we use the Dijkstra's algorithm on the portion of the graphs representing their giant components. Since the algorithm has a time complexity of O(V 2 ), and since some of our graphs are very large, we sample a fixed number of 10,000 pairs of vertices for each graph. To better compare the results obtained with and without re-insertion, we sample the starting vertices of the paths within the components obtained without re-insertion, one at each value of the threshold. Then, we sample the ending vertices of the paths within the set of nodes that becomes connected to the component after re-insertion (not included in the component without reinsertion). In case of no re-insertion, both the starting and the ending vertices are chosen within the set of nodes in the components.
For each largest connected component, obtained with the different thresholds and re-insertion strategies, we calculate the set of shortest paths between the sampled pairs of starting-ending nodes. Then, we calculate four measures to quantify the content spreadability of the paths and we average them for all the obtained paths at each configuration. The measures we calculate are the following: (i) the length, in number of nodes, of the path. This represents the effective average distance in number of hops between the nodes in the component (note that we include also the starting and the ending nodes in the count); (ii) The sum of the weights of the path, which represents the cost for information to travel through a specific path. In fact, the sum of the weights on the paths indicates the total cost to pass through the path; (iii) The average contact frequency of the links of the path; and (iv) the product of the contact frequencies on the path, which can be interpreted as the effective loss in terms of trustworthiness of information travelling on the path.
Strategies for link reinsertion
As will be clear from the results in Section 4, for some threshold on the trust level we obtain quite small largest connected components, and a big number of extremely small additional disconnected components. To improve network connectivity we tried, as a possible alternative to lowering the trust value of the system, the re-insertion of one social contact for each user in the graph obtained at each level of trust, testing several possible re-insertion strategies. Considering that high contact frequency indicates strong relationships between users, strategies which privilege links with higher contact frequency are clearly the most appealing. For this reason, we considered the strategy "highest frequency" (indicated as "high freq" in the tables) which deterministically re-inserts the link with the highest frequency below the threshold. Note that, the reinserted link could show a contact frequency sensibly lower than the threshold value, not necessarily belonging to the first excluded layer, since for some ego networks some of the layers could not be present. We also considered a "probabilistic" strategy ("Prob" in the tables) assigning to each excluded link a probability to be reinserted proportional to its contact frequency. Thus, compared to the previous strategy, the probabilistic one gives more chances of re-insertion to weaker links. These links are usually bridges connecting parts of the network socially far from each other, and they are short-cuts which could positively impact on network connectivity and spreadability. Note that this is compatible with the idea behind the Kleinberg's small-world model, for which nodes are densely connected to neighbour nodes, with which they share several social contacts, but they also have long-range links with other nodes socially far from them [24] . The combination of these two properties in the model leads to short average path length in the network. To assess the goodness of the strategies we introduced also a baseline "Random" strategy ("Rand" in the tables), which assigns to each link the same probability to be reinserted. For completeness, we also introduced two additional strategies which privileges the link with lowest interaction frequencies, which are the worst choices considering the trust of the relationship, but could introduce more bridges. Specifically, we considered the following strategies: "lowest frequency" ("low freq in the tables") which deterministically selects the link with the lowest contact frequency, and the "inverse probabilistic" ("Inv prob" in the tables) which assigns to each link a probability inversely proportional to the interaction frequency of the link. Obviously, many more strategies can be defined and analysed, but we though that with this five strategies we can asses whether the reinsertion of a single link leads to an improvement in terms of network connectivity and spreadability.
Results

Network connectivity
The network connectivity of the graphs obtained after the pre-processing phase described in Section 3 is reported in Table 1 in the column "No insert", indicating that we have not applied any re-insertion strategy on these results. The first largest component obtained with the threshold coinciding with the contact frequency of "active social contacts" (as defined in Section 3.1) guarantees node coverage close to 1. This means that with this minimum level of trust the network could potentially support the diffusion of information to almost all the nodes. On the other hand, the most strict threshold ("very intimate friends") leads to a node coverage of ∼ 0.03. This means that the resulting network is highly disconnected, and can hardly support information diffusion. The remaining thresholds represent intermidiate results, with node coverage ∼ 0.3 for "friends" and ∼ 0.2 for "close friends". Whilst these results are clearly suboptimal with respect to the "active social contacts" threshold, they could still be exploited in circumstances not needing a complete coverage of the nodes, but requiring more trust between them. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the size of the components of connected nodes in the network excluded the largest one, in which, for all the thresholds, and especially in case of no re-insertion, these components are always very small with respect to the giant component. In fact, the distributions show power-law trends with a maximum component size of 95 nodes. This indicates that if we wanted to reach a high number of nodes in the network and the largest component was not sufficient to do so, it would be necessary to place information on a large number of additional components, without relying on automatic spread of information over trusted social links. This is further confirmed by the results in Tables 2, 3 , 4, and 5 under the row "No insert". The tables report the number of components which must be infected by information to reach the desired level of node coverage. Thus, only the threshold of one message per year (Table 2) generates a graph that requires a small amount of message replicas (just one message for 90 % node coverage), whereas for the other thresholds the number of replicas needed to reach a coverage of at least 50 % of the network is very high and would result in a very expensive process. Moreover, whilst it could be relatively easy to identify the largest component in the network, it is not easy to identify all the remaining components, especially in decentralised systems like DOSN. This fact could further limit the diffusion process.
To improve the network coverage, thus permitting larger information sperads expecially for disconnected graphs resulting from restrictive thresholds, we evaluate the reinsertion strategies as possible alternatives to the generalised decrease of the trust level. We apply the re-insertions on the Facebook graph at each threshold. In Table 1 , from the third to the last column, we report the size of the largest component of connected nodes for each combination of threshold and re-insertion strategy. As can be noted, the impact of the re-insertion is substantial for thresholds > 1/12. The impact of link re-insertion for the threshold of 1/12 is negligible, since most of the nodes of the original network are already present in the resulting graph. On Table 2 Number of components needed to cover the specified percentage of nodes in the original network using a min. the other hand, for the most restrictive threshold (4 messages per month) the gain due to the re-insertion is effective, bringing the node coverage to ∼ 40 % which indicates a giant component of about 15 times larger than the one without re-insertion. The results of the different strategies vary significantly, with the probabilistic and the random strategies ("Prob" and "Rand" in the tables) giving the highest improvement in terms of number of nodes covered, as reported in Table 1 . In addition, as reported in Tables 2, 3 , 4 and 5, these two strategies seem the most convenient (at least from the point of view of the number of connected nodes) also when all the other components, in addition to the largest one, are considered. Considering the cost for the users, the probabilistic strategy is intuitively better than the random one since guarantees that, on average, the re-inserted nodes have higher trust level than randomly selected nodes.
We also look at how the different re-insertion strategies impact on the distributions of the sizes of network components other than the largest one (see Fig. 3 ). All strategies, for each threshold, produce a similar distribution of the size of the components (the largest one is not present). Nevertheless, the distributions vary from the case in which no re-insertion is applied, especially for restrictive thresholds (1 message per month and 4 messages per month). This can be explained by the fact that for these thresholds the largest component is sensibly smaller than for the other thresholds, and the probability of re-inserting a node connected to this component is lower. Thus, there is the presence of a higher number of larger components disconnected from the largest one.
Network spreadability
Hitherto, we analysed the ability of the network limited to a certain level of trust to maintain nodes connected to each other, as a first requirement for information diffusion. However, the mere presence of a path connecting all the nodes in one or more components of the network indicates only the possibility to reach the nodes with information, but it does not consider the effective ability of the graph to spread content. To delve deeper into the analysis of spreadability of the networks, we calculate the set of measures introduced in Section 3.3, calculating the properties of weighted shortest paths in the graphs. For this analysis we consider only the giant component of connected nodes since it is the most important part of the network for the diffusion of information. In Table 6 we report the average length of the shortest paths sampled in the components.
From the table we can note that comparing the basic case without re-insertion and the different re-insertion policies, there is no sensible difference in terms of average shortest path length for the first threshold (i.e., 1/12). This is in line with the results found in terms of connectivity since the largest component found at this threshold is large enough to contain most of the nodes in the original graph. For the threshold of 8/12 msg/month, the results are consistent amongst the different re-insertion policies, and the average length sees an additional node compared to the case without re-insertion. This difference increases for the remaining thresholds, with a maximum difference of ∼ 4 nodes between the best and the worst results ("high frequency" and "inverse probabilistic" respectively) for the threshold of 4 msg/month. In case of this threshold, the difference between the path length in the largest component without re-insertion and the components with re-insertion is of at least ∼ 2.5 nodes. From the data in Table 6 it is worth noting that the average length of weighted shortest paths is considerably higher than the same measure in unweighted social graphs, that is known to be around six [37] in social networks. This is due to the fact that the shortest weighted paths we obtained include links with very high trust belonging to the most internal ego network layers, and which, for their low traversing cost, are frequently used in the paths. In unweighted networks, each link has the same cost and this effect is not present.
A similar trend can be derived from the figures in Tables 7 and 8 , which show the total cost of the paths and the average contact frequency of the paths, that is proportional to the average trust level of the links. For these measures the best and the worst re-insertion policies for the different thresholds appear to be the "highest frequency", and the "lowest frequency" and "inverse probabilistic" respectively. This is an intuitive result, since the weight we used to calculate the shortest paths is directly related to the contact frequency. Note that the "highest frequency" and the "lowest frequency" policies are associated to sensibly smaller network graphs than the other policies, as reported in Table 1 . This means that, even though the "highest frequency" policy seems to be the best choice from the point of view of network spreadability, it leads to poor node coverage. Table 9 reports the product of the normalised contact frequencies on the shortest paths, that estimates the frequency at which information traverses the whole path. The measure is influenced both by the contact frequency of the links on the shortest paths and their length. As it can be noted from the results in the table, these measure is consistent with the previous results.
It is worth noting that there is a trade-off between node coverage of the component and the spreadability of its network graph. The average trust level decays when reinsertion is applied since more hops are added to the paths in the component, and the trust level of the re-inserted links is lower than the threshold of the component. The decay varies with the value of the threshold, and it could be too high in some cases. Nevertheless, the "probabilistic" strategy is the one giving a the best node coverage, and maintaining good spreadability at the same time, and seems the most reasonable choice. 
Discussion
The analysis we performed allowed us to discover a series of properties of DOSN which can be useful to design new peer-to-peer services on top of DOSN communication mechanisms. Specifically, the results of our analysis highlight the following properties:
-The number of nodes connected by a DOSN could be highly influenced by the required minimum level of trust. If only very intimate friends are willing to communicate with each other, information diffusion is severely limited. -By re-inserting in the network of trusted peers even a single social link with probability proportional to its trust (under the threshold) for each user is sufficient to reach a higher node coverage. Choosing the link with a probabilistic strategy is clearly preferable since the re-insertion involves most of the time trusted contacts, but sometimes also weak links are selected, which significantly increase node coverage and improve spreadability, connecting parts of the network far from each other. -Considering that information travels more easily through links with high trust levels, the length of average weighted shortest paths between pairs of nodes in the network is significantly higher than the length of shortest paths in unweighted "small-world" networks.
In particular, the assumption that the distance between any two nodes in the network is proportional to the logarithm of the number of nodes in the network is not necessarily true when weighted links are considered.
Our results indicate the presence of a high percentage of links at a very high level of trust through which information can move to different parts of the network following several links at a very low cost. -In accordance with the previous result, the best reinsertion policy is the one which selects links proportionally to their contact frequency (i.e., trust) since it leads to a good increase in terms of node coverage, with a low impact on the cost of the paths. -It is noteworthy that re-insertion policies cause a limited decrease in terms of trust, and they represent a valid alternative to choosing a lower threshold in terms of trust.
Related work
In this section we present the most relevant work in the literature concerning the context of our analysis, which includes DOSN and the analysis of information diffusion in OSN.
Distributed online social networks
DOSN were born in recent years to address privacy concerns over OSN. Diaspora* [1] is probably the most famous DOSN nowadays. Diaspora* supports the possibility of either creating a server (called pod) where the user can host her personal data or using an already existing one. Social interactions are carried out through a P2P system that makes users communicate directly with each other, without passing through a single centralised server. Buchegger et al. [11] propose a similar solution, which has been also extended to be used in case of absence of stable Internet connectivity [10] , a scenario particularly suited for mobile devices. Guidi et al. [19] propose a DOSN based on the automatic identification, for each user, of her ego network layers, using the contact frequency between the user and her social contacts. The differences in terms of trust between the different layers are used to automatically adjust the privacy policies towards the people in the layers. Moreover, the personal social network of each user is limited to her "active network", and people beyond it are excluded from the main features of the system. The solutions proposed by Han and colleagues [21] and Cutillo et al. [16] further exploit trust relationships arranged in concentric layers around the users to replicate the data of the user on her friend's devices, guaranteeing the access to her data even though her device were inaccessible due to a temporary disconnection or turnoffs.
Information diffusion analysis in OSN
In the last few years OSN have attracted a lot of interest from the Research community. One of the distinctive properties of OSN, which differentiate them from other kinds of networks, including technological and biological networks, is the presence of a non-trivial clustering coefficient (or transitivity) [26] . This indicates a high probability that two neighbours connected to a node will also be connected to each other. Moreover, social networks (including OSN) show the so called small-world property [37] . According to this property, any two persons in the network, indirectly connected by chains of social links, have a short average distance. This fact directly influences the ability of the network to quickly spread information, ideas, innovations and so forth. It has been demonstrated that the diffusion of information in social networks takes place through single social links, creating the word-of-mouth effect [18] . This property has been largely used by a collection of marketing techniques whereby the presence of social links between consumers is exploited to increase sales [23] . Recent studies on OSN have identified a set of structural properties impacting on the capacity of the network to diffuse information, and the role of different types of users in the diffusion process [6, 12] . Moreover, content locality plays an important role in the diffusion of information in OSN [13] . This means that information diffusion is often limited to the immediate neighbours (or n-hops neighbours, with small values of n) of the user who generated the content. Thus, identifying influential nodes covering the role of opinion leaders able to generate large diffusions, and detecting popular topics are important tasks for the analysis and prediction of information diffusion [20] . Based on these remarks, several models have been proposed to simulate information diffusion in OSN [14, 17, 28, 32] . These models are generally derived from static observations of diffusion patterns in OSN, as in the case of the Facebook dataset we analysed in this work. Recently, Taxidou and Fisher presented a set of methods for the analysis of real-time diffusion of information, through the online analysis of data generated by Twitter [35, 36] . Compared to static approaches, these methods are able to cope with the constant availability of new data from OSN.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the possible impact of the restriction of communications in DOSN to trusted social relationships only. This restriction is essential in DOSN, since the users are willing to distribute information coming only from trusted peers to limit the resources they dedicate to communications, that are generally limited. To perform the analysis we studied the topological properties of the social graph generated by DOSN with such restrictions, looking for the presence of a large component of connected nodes (at a certain threshold of trust), within which information can spread and possibly reach all its nodes. On the other hand, disconnected small components and isolated nodes represent portions of the network that are difficult to reach and that will limit the diffusion of information.
Since the collection of a social graph representing DOSN is not easy, for the distributed nature of the system, we performed our analysis on a large-scale Facebook graph and, assuming that no central control exists upon it, we limited it selecting only links above a certain level of trust, estimated through the contact frequency between users. Hence, by applying four different thresholds, used in the literature as a natural classification for human social relationships, as the minimum level of trust in the network, we studied the connectivity of the resulting graph. The results indicate that for the threshold representing "active social contacts" for the users, the resulting graph is highly connected and contains a large component covering more than 96 % of the original network. On the other hand, for more restrictive thresholds, the node coverage drops significantly.
To overcome a situation where diffusing information could be problematic due to the selected threshold on trust, we propose, in addition to a mere reduction of the global level of trust in the network, a different approach based on the addition to the list of trusted nodes of each user a single social contact, that was outside the list that would be excluded based on the selected threshold. We investigated different strategies to select this social contact, from a pure uniform random selection to the selection of the one with highest/lowest contact frequency with the considered user. Considering only the number of nodes reinserted in the network, the most effective strategies are a probabilistic selection of the contact based on its contact frequency and a uniform random selection. However, when we consider also the effective ability of the network to diffuse information, the strategy with the best coverage/spreadability combination appears to be only the probabilistic one. This strategy is compatible with Kleinberg's small-world model, whereby nodes maintain social links with neighbours in dense gegions of the network, but to obtain short paths in the network they need to establish also long-range links with nodes socially far from them.
